In 1984, North Korea conducted a series of tests of Hwasong-5 prototypes from the Musudan-ri flight-test facility, reportedly totaling three successful and three failed launches.5 Serial production of the Hwasong-5 probably began around 1985–86 and continued until around 1991–92, when serial production of the extended range Scud-C (Hwasong-6) missile began, most likely using the same facilities, materials and equipment previously used for the Hwasong-5. Early versions of the Hwasong-5 were delivered to Iran for use during the Iran–Iraq War, which provided the opportunity for North Korean engineers to collect valuable data on the operational use of this missile and to improve production. Based on essentially the same airframe as the Hwasong-5, the Hwasong-6 was designed to achieve a longer range (of 500km) by reducing the payload from 1,000kg to around 700–800kg, expanding the size of the internal fuel tanks, and slightly modifying the engine for longer burn time. The extended range was of particular interest to Pyongyang, since such missiles could reach all targets in South Korea and also meet the demands of Middle Eastern customers for a longerrange missile. The CEP of the Hwasong-6 is unknown, but the missile was probably less accurate than the shorter-range Hwasong-5 – perhaps in the order of 1–2km.14 Pyongyang reportedly conducted five tests of the Hwasong-6: in June 1990; July 1991; and May 1993 – the last a multiple test with three missiles. In addition to the Hwasong-6, Pyongyang may have worked on other Scud variants such as the Scud-D with even lighter payloads and longer ranges, but it is not known whether any of these were produced in significant numbers and deployed. Production of the Hwasong-6 (and other possible Scud variants) may have been phased out in the mid-1990s as North Korea began to build No-dong missiles.
Targeting doctrine and armament for Hwasong-5/-6 missiles is uncertain. Some Hwasong-5/-6 missiles are equipped with unitary high-explosive warheads and perhaps submunition bomblets, intended for delivery against cities, and military-related command locations, ports, and airports throughout South Korea. Inaccuracy and missile defences would limit the missile’s military effectiveness against any target. However, the political impact of, and the civilian terror generated by a number of missiles hitting cities on a daily basis, could create tremendous political pressure on leaders. Along with unitary warheads, North Korea may have been able to develop submunition bomblets to blanket a small target area. Military planners in the US and South Korea assume that chemical and possibly biological warheads are also available, although this cannot be confirmed. North Korea is almost certainly capable of building unitary CBW warheads with various types of agents and impact fusing; whether it has developed more sophisticated means of delivering CBW involving proximity fuses and bomblets is unknown. Hwasong-5/ -6 missiles are generally thought to have too small a diameter to deliver a first generation nuclear warhead.
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